Getting to Yes With Iran: pHalting Iran's progress toward a bomb will require the United States to make credible promises and credible threats simultaneously -- an exceedingly difficult trick to pull off. For coercive diplomacy to work, Washington may need to put more of its cards on the table./p
The United States' recent record of coercive diplomacy is not
encouraging. A combination of sanctions, inspections, and threats led
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to freeze his weapons of mass destruction
program after the Gulf War, but it did not coerce him into accepting a
long-term agreement. The reasons, as researchers have learned since
Saddam's ouster, had to do with his motives and perceptions. The Iraqi
leader not only sought regional dominance and the destruction of Israel
but also worried about appearing weak to Iran, saw his survival in the
wake of the Gulf War as a victory, and was so suspicious of the United
States that a real rapprochement was never within reach. All this
rendered ineffective the threats issued by the George W. Bush
administration during the run-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and
would likely have made promises of a reasonable settlement ineffective
as well.
The Iraq case, moreover, is less an exception than the norm. Coercive
diplomacy has worked on a few occasions, such as in 2003, when the
Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi chose to stop developing weapons of
mass destruction partly as a result of pressure and reassurances from
the United States. More often than not, however, in recent decades the
United States has failed at coercive diplomacy even though it has had
overwhelming power and has made it clear that it will use force if
necessary. A succession of relatively weak adversaries, including Panama
(1989), Iraq (1990 and 2003), Serbia (1998), and Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan (2001), did not respond to American attempts at pressure,
leading Washington to fall back repeatedly on direct military action.
Coercive diplomacy did convince the military junta that ruled Haiti to
step down in 1994, but only once it was clear that U.S. warplanes were
already in the air. And today, Iran is hardly alone in its defiance:
despite issuing many threats and promises, the United States has been
unable to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear arsenal or even
refrain from sharing its nuclear expertise with other countries (as it
apparently did with Syria).
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