If lots of things were priced in SDRs, the IMF’s decision would have forced companies around the world to buy yuan-denominated assets as soon as possible, to hedge their exposure. That would have prompted China’s currency to strengthen dramatically. But the Suez transit fees are a rare case; few other goods or services are priced in SDRs. Instead, admission to the currency club is significant mainly for its symbolism: the IMF is lending its imprimatur to the yuan as a reserve currency—a safe, liquid asset in which governments can park their wealth. Indeed, far from setting off a groundswell of demand for the yuan, the IMF’s decision may pave the way for the yuan’s depreciation.
The reason is that the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) will now find itself under more pressure to manage the yuan as central banks in most developed economies do: by letting market forces determine their prices. In bringing the yuan into the SDR, the IMF had to determine that it is “freely usable”. This is a large leap of faith in a currency which is still heavily managed, so before coming to this decision, the IMF asked China to make changes to its currency regime.http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21679341-its-new-status-might-make-weaker-yuan-chinese-renminbi-joins-imfs?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/thechineserenminbijoinstheimfsreservecurrencybasket
