Sunday 29 June 2014

Islamist militants raid hotel in central Somalia: witnesses

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-somalia-blast-idUSKBN0F10HF20140626

At least 21 killed in rush-hour blast in Nigerian capital

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-nigeria-blast-idUSKBN0F01WP20140626

Algeria, Egypt's Sisi talk security, gas shipments

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/uk-algeria-egypt-gas-idUSKBN0F117620140626

Divergent visions could split Iraq's Sunni revolt

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-iraq-security-isil-power-insight-idUSKBN0F11CR20140626

Iraq PM says Syrian air strikes hit Syrian, not Iraqi, territory: BBC

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-iraq-security-interview-idUSKBN0F11DR20140626

Cameroon army says kills at least 10 suspected Boko Haram militants

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-cameroon-security-boko-haram-idUSKBN0F11KT20140626

Libya to move new parliament to Benghazi despite collapse of security

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-libya-elections-idUSKBN0F12CH20140626

African leaders' summit urges action on rising militant threat


African leaders called on Thursday for firm action against a rising Islamist militant threat stretching across the continent from Kenya to Mali and pledged to furnish the tools for Africa to police its own conflicts.
Violence cast a shadow over the opening of the two-day summit of the 54-nation African Union (AU) as Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan rushed home to deal with the aftermath of a bombing in the capital Abuja on Wednesday.
At least 21 people died in the attack by suspected Boko Haram militants.
"The continent faces an increasing challenge in trans-border threats, with terrorism at the forefront," newly elected President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt told the opening ceremony in the Equatorial Guinea capital Malabo.
"We need to strengthen our cooperation and align our national policies to effectively counter this."

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-afru-summit-idUSKBN0F12V320140626

U.S. takes time to gather data before any attacks on ISIL in Iraq


U.S. intelligence about the Islamist insurgent offensive in Iraq is improving but it could take weeks to complete a detailed picture of the threat and any possible American air attacks do not appear imminent, U.S. officials said on Thursday.
Last week's announcement that up to 300 U.S. military advisers were being sent to Baghdad and the earlier movement of an aircraft carrier, a cruiser and a destroyer into the Gulf prompted speculation of impending military action against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants.
"We’re just not there yet,"


http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/27/us-iraq-security-usa-intelligence-idUSKBN0F202Z20140627

ISIL staged 'mass executions' in Iraq's Tikrit: rights group


Photograph and satellite imagery indicate that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) insurgents have carried out mass executions in the northern Iraqi city of Tikrit, Human Rights Watch reported on Friday.
ISIL, radical Islamists who want to re-create a mediaeval-style caliphate straddling Iraq and Syria, has stormed largely unopposed across much of northern Iraq, taking cities including Mosul and Tikrit, seizing border posts with Syria and advancing to within some 100 km (62 miles) of the capital Baghdad.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/27/us-iraq-security-tikrit-rights-idUSKBN0F20WS20140627

Armed U.S. aircraft now flying over Iraq: defense officials


The Obama administration is flying armed aircraft over Iraq, defense officials said on Friday, adding that the flights were aimed at gathering intelligence and ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel on the ground rather than conducting strikes.
"What I would tell you is that we continue to fly both manned and unmanned aircraft over Iraq at the ... Iraqi government's request, predominantly for reconnaissance purposes. Some of those aircraft are armed," Rear Admiral John Kirby, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters.
"The reason that some of those aircraft are armed is primarily for force protection reasons now that we have introduced into the country some military advisers whose objective will be to operate outside the confines of the embassy," he said.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/27/us-iraq-security-usa-flights-idUSKBN0F22DR20140627

Suspected Islamists stage attacks in southern Yemen as Ramadan begins


http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/28/us-yemen-violence-idUSKBN0F30DI20140628

Khamenei calls Iraq war a showdown between humanity and barbarity


Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the Iraq conflict a "showdown between humanity and barbarian savagery" and criticized Western media for portraying it as a war between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims.
Outside powers have often exploited ethnic and religious divisions in Muslim states and "they dream of a war between Shi'ites and Sunnis" that would not happen, he said in Tehran, according to an official statement.
He warned against what he called Western propaganda about "a cast of morons and Saddam Hussein leftovers," apparent references to the radical Sunni Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group and Sunni tribes who once sided with the country's deposed dictator and now fight with ISIL.
"The incident in Iraq is not a war between Shi'ites and Sunnis," Khamenei said at a meeting with families of victims of a 1981 bombing that destroyed the Tehran headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republic Party in 1981.
"It is a battle between supporters and opponents of terrorism, it's a war between fans of America and the West and those favoring independence for their nation," he said of the Iraq violence. "It’s a showdown between humanity and barbarian savagery."


http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/28/us-iraq-security-iran-idUSKBN0F30KP20140628

Saudi king, in Ramadan message, vows to crush terrorists

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/28/us-saudi-ramadan-idUSKBN0F30P920140628

Beijing to boost police gun training amid security threats

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-china-guns-idUSKBN0F40CF20140629

ISIL crucifies eight rival fighters, says monitoring group


http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-syria-crisis-rivals-idUSKBN0F40HX20140629

China sentences 113 on terror crimes in Xinjiang

Courts in China's western Xinjiang region have sentenced 113 people to jail terms ranging from 10 years to life for terrorist activities and other crimes, the Xinjiang government said, the latest in a slew of prosecutions targeting militant separatism.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-china-xinjiang-idUSKBN0F507W20140630

After Iraq gains, Qaeda offshoot claims Islamic "caliphate"


The group, previously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and also known as ISIS, has renamed itself "Islamic State" and proclaimed its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as "Caliph" - the head of the state, the statement said.
"He is the imam and khalifah (Caliph) for the Muslims everywhere," the group's spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani said in the statement, which was translated into several languages and read out in an Arabic audio speech.
"Accordingly, the "Iraq and Sham" (Levant) in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration," he said.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-syria-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0F40SL20140629

Saturday 14 June 2014

The Different Taliban Worlds

Are there two separate Talibans or one coordinated Taliban?
If we look at the Afghan Taliban, we are basically talking about the group that ran Afghanistan right up until just after 9/11. Their remnants and their leader, Mullah Omar, by most accounts are said to be based somewhere inside Pakistan, probably inside Balochistan. And then you have a significant offshoot that also swears allegiance to him: the Haqqani Network, based further to the north in North Waziristan, also inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban is notable for having hosted bin Laden and embracing a worldview that is backward, violent, and extreme. However, they are Afghanistan-oriented and focused. There really have been no instances of the Afghan Taliban turning their guns on the Pakistani state, attacking the people of Pakistan, or, more importantly in this case, the military.
So, the Pakistani Taliban is different?
Yes, quite different. The Pakistani Taliban, which has a younger lifespan, really came about in the mid-2000s, broadly in response to Pakistani military operations that took place inside Pakistan, but along the Afghan border. This group is dedicated to many of the same broad ends as the Afghan Taliban, and have even sworn allegiance to the Afghan Taliban to those ends. But they are also dedicated to attacking the Pakistani military, state, and civilians, which they have done to devastating effect, over the past decade or so. They are responsible for killing former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, shooting the young student and now global education activist Malala Yousafzai, for blowing up of the Marriot hotel in Islamabad—the list goes on. So they are much more actively at war with the Pakistani state.
But it is often said that the Pakistani government is the one who supports the Taliban.
If we say that the Pakistani government supports the Taliban, and we say that the Pakistani government is the target of the Taliban, we are telling the truth in both instances. And you could even say that the Afghan Taliban (i.e., the older Taliban) is playing a double game on the Pakistani state. On the one hand, they have said they won't attack the Pakistani state, and in doing so, they or more or less get safe haven inside the tribal areas along the Afghan border, they have a truce and, some people would say, an even closer working relationship with the Pakistani state. And on the other hand, the Afghan Taliban have been helpful to the Pakistani Taliban, they are an inspiration to the Pakistani Taliban, and they also, by many accounts, provide them with training, access to financing, and sometimes even fighters.
Regarding this latest attack on the Karachi airport, there is a claim that Uzbek fighters were responsible for the attack. This may or may not be true, but these are the kinds of people who would float back and forth between the different Taliban groups.

Battling for Brazil’s Favelas

With the World Cup approaching, residents of the slums surrounding Rio de Janeiro have been lashing out against the statewide "pacification" plan launched in 2008 to curb drug violence and lawlessness. Under the program, military police units occupy the slums, known as favelas, and evict drug gangs, but residents have accused police of brutality, adding to the country's seething discontent in the run-up to the mega sporting event.
Janice Perlman, founder and president of the Mega-Cities Project, says Rio lost an important opportunity to improve the lives of favela residents by focusing on military approaches rather than funding social services. "It's a tense moment," Perlman says. "In addition, if Brazil loses the games, it would be likely to cause massive depression psychologically, economically, and politically." But she says there may be an opportunity to remedy the state's approach to the favelas before the 2016 Olympics, also to be held in Brazil.
Can you give of a snapshot of the problems that were being faced by favela residents in Rio de Janeiro before pacification started in 2008?
[The favelas] provide housing for some 1.7 million residents today—people who cannot afford to buy or rent in the formal housing market. Their location has enabled generations of new arrivals to access work, education, and healthcare and offer better opportunities for their children.
At the end of the military dictatorship, with the promise of democracy and direct vote improving favela conditions, the "war on drugs" crackdown in Colombia led to the rerouting of the cocaine trade, part of which went through Rio de Janeiro. The favelas afforded a convenient hiding place for the drug traffic due to the steep hills, winding alleyways, and, most of all, the lack of police presence—the absence of the state.
In one favela after another, elected leaders were forced out and replaced by agents of the dominant drug gang. The lucrative drug and arms trade led to violent turf wars between gangs punctuated by intermittent police raids during which the motto was, "Kill first, ask questions later." At the same time, militias composed of off-duty policemen and firemen took control of other favelas, charging transaction fees, extracting "protection payments" and killing with impunity anyone who disobeyed their rules.
As more and more favelas were taken over by the traffic or the militias, lethal violence reached an all-time high. The drug lords became ever more brazen, closing down commerce in Rio one day with threats to kill any storeowner who opened shop, and shooting up the municipal office building. Public security took on greater urgency with Rio's successful bids for the World Cup and the Summer Olympics.
This was the context in which the state government launched the UPP—the Pacifying Police Units—in November 2008. The goal was for the state to take back control of the territory from the narco-traffic.
How does pacification work?
First of all, the very word "pacification" was an affront to the favela residents, who did not see the military police invasion as a liberation, but as a 24/7 occupation.
The idea behind the UPP was zero tolerance for carrying firearms, and the reassertion of state control. The first operation began with a surprise attack by the Special Forces, but that ended in disaster with scores of innocent people killed in the shootout. It was replaced by prior announcement of the invasion date, giving the drug lords the opportunity to move out and avoid armed confrontation.
Once that was done, the police set up a barracks and began patrolling the community. They were not well received by the residents, who had experienced their indiscriminate violence, refusal to pay local businesses for food or drinks they consumed, and their obvious collaboration with gangs in the confiscation and resale of arms and drugs. The favela residents had more confidence in the dealers, so the entire premise was shaky from the start.
The human and social services—"Social UPP"—were supposed to begin providing benefits to the community residents as soon as it was safe to do so. The planned job training, computer labs, improved schools and family clinics, sports and leisure facilities, and a whole array of other services were supposed to show the positive side of state presence by reaching out to the people and helping them reintegrate into the rest of Rio de Janeiro society.
Unfortunately, this never materialized.
What has been the outcome of the program so far?
The program expanded rapidly and now covers thirty-eight favelas at an expenditure of about $360 million dollars annually. Only one of them is in a militia-controlled area, and almost all of them are located at strategic sites for the World Cup or the Olympics. It appears that this rapid expansion outpaced the capacity to recruit and train the pacifying police, and that there was an increase in the abuse of power. Residents were bullied, beaten up, and began disappearing. Recently, a bricklayer was tortured and killed in a case of mistaken identity, and a wounded female bystander in another incident was stuffed into the trunk of a police car, fell out, and was dragged to her death.
"The situation has deteriorated so severely that the national army has been called in to maintain order."
Incidents like these increased over the past year, but particularly in the past three months, as tensions grew with the upcoming World Cup. This overall discontent provided an opening for some of the drug gangs to reappear and challenge the UPPs in armed confrontations. The situation has deteriorated so severely that the national army has been called in to maintain order.
What can be learned from this?
I see this as a policy case study of missed opportunity. In the first several years of the UPP, when I was doing field research on people's perceptions of the program, I saw a feeling of great relief at the freedom to come and go at will, despite the expressed caution—to sit out on the steps in the evenings listening to music and no longer fear that children would be killed in the crossfire on their way home from school. In some communities, people had lived for twenty-five years in a state of tension. If their relief at being able to conduct daily life without fear had been reinforced by the delivery of social services and by a participatory process for determining community needs, this crisis might have been avoided.
There was always—and still is—the suspicion that the day the Olympics are over in 2016 will be the day that the UPP leaves and the drug dealers come back. So nobody ever wanted to make an alliance with the UPP officers, because they knew that they would pay dearly when the traffic returned.
How do you see these tensions playing out as the World Cup gets underway?
That's a prediction that no one can make. Everyone is hoping that with a bit of luck the marvelous city will pull together and Brazil will take its place as a mature democracy on the world stage.
This is a decisive moment. It has repercussions for Brazil's economy and polity—even for the reelection of President Dilma Rousseff. If the World Cup proceeds peacefully—without the sense of it occurring in a police state—and if Brazil happens to win, that would provide more than a boost in morale.
"There was always—and still is—the suspicion that the day the Olympics are over in 2016 will be the day … the drug dealers come back."
If, on the other hand, there is uncontrolled violence—if protests break out and the police react with force—it will be tragic regardless of the outcome of the games. If in addition, if Brazil loses the games, it would be likely to cause massive depression psychologically, economically, and politically. It's a tense moment.
Do you foresee another opportunity to improve this situation after the World Cup?
I'm an optimistic person. I would love to see a reversal of the repressive approach to dealing with the violence borne of exclusion, inequality, and struggle for livelihoods. In the two years before the Summer Olympics, there is an opportunity for a mid-course correction. If the 1.7 million people living in Rio's favelas were included as part of the solution—if substantial investments were made in education, job training and work opportunities (some generated by the games themselves)—and if any new infrastructure was considered for its social use and value after the games, then perhaps the military will not be necessary in 2016.
My hope is that the next two years can demonstrate the value of tapping into the intelligence, energy and potential of the favela residents rather than treating them as a problem to be kept under control. I am keeping my fingers crossed that Brazil, and Rio especially, can get through this event and have another chance.
http://www.cfr.org/brazil/battling-brazils-favelas/p33080?cid=rss-analysisbriefbackgroundersexp-battling_for_brazil%E2%80%99s_favelas-060914

Syria: Humanitarian Disaster—and Security Threat


Syria: Humanitarian Disaster—and Security Threat

Author: Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies
June 13, 2014

The refugee flows and the jihadi presence, which are both growing, constitute a threat to Syria, its neighbors, and the interests of the United States. Today, foreign fighters from around the globe are said to number anywhere from 8,000—the estimate given by Gen. Lloyd Austin, U.S. Central Commander—to 12,000, and several of the groups are linked to al-Qaeda. The Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, said in April 2014 that "Syria has become a matter of homeland security," and the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said in January 2014 that one of the al-Qaeda-aligned Syrian jihadi groups "does have aspirations for attacks on the homeland."Among the foreign jihadis now fighting in Syria there are believed to be seventy Americans.
The U.S. Reaction
The U.S. government's reaction has been almost entirely humanitarian, through aid to neighboring countries and to various UN and private agencies. Soon the total will reach $2 billion.
President Obama has been extremely reluctant to lift U.S. involvement from the humanitarian and diplomatic to the military. His 2012 decision against military aid to the Syrian rebels was made against the advice of his top national security officials at that time, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CIA Director David Petraeus, Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey, and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. His last-minute decision in August 2013 not to strike Syria after its use of chemical weapons was popular in the Pentagon and with the public, but clearly went against advice from Secretary of State John Kerry.
In June 2013 the administration announced the provision of some aid to the rebels, but from all evidence little or no material help actually followed. Finally in late May 2014, the president himself announced in his speech at West Point a decision to give additional aid to the rebels: "I will work with Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators."
The Price of Inaction
U.S. policy since the start of the rebellion in Syria in 2011 has failed. Regime brutality against the majority-Sunni population of Syria and intervention by foreign Shia forces (Iranian and Hezbollah) have attracted a far larger and more dangerous group of jihadis than ever existed in Afghanistan, one whose threat to U.S. allies and interests keeps growing. That the Iranian and Hezbollah intervention has elicited no serious U.S. response has not only favored the regime's survival, but shaken faith in American reliability among all U.S. allies in the region and beyond.
That Iran has appeared far more determined to win in Syria, defined as keeping Assad in power, than the United States has appeared in achieving its stated goal (that Assad must go) similarly shakes confidence in U.S. power and willpower. The huge and growing refugee burdens threaten stability in Jordan, long a key U.S. ally, and in Lebanon. And the fact that Assad is an Alawite trying to rule a 74 percent Sunni country suggests that with him in power there will never be stability, only more war.
Less tangibly but of equal importance, U.S. willingness to enforce the norms of international conduct has been undermined, as has American moral leadership. The association of the United States with the cause of human rights and democracy, going back at least to Woodrow Wilson, has been weakened by its unwillingness to act in the Syrian case. America's soft power is linked to its reputation for idealism and the defense of human values. The refusal to use hard power in the Syrian case has contributed to a diminution of soft power as well.
Needed: A New Policy
The early goal of a quick departure for Assad and transition to democracy in Syria is now impossible to attain. More disorder and suffering are certain. But Syria need not be an endless source of refugees, a center of inhuman suffering at the hands of a vicious minority regime, and a worldwide gathering place for jihadi extremists.
First, the United States must establish a serious program to train and equip the rebels. Diplomacy has failed: the efforts made by the United States in Geneva to reach a political accord cannot now succeed, because diplomacy will always reflect the power relationships on the ground. Those must be changed by strengthening the anti-Assad, anti-jihadi forces composed of nationalist Syrian rebels.Their weakness is largely linked to their possession of very limited amounts of guns and other equipment, and limited amounts of money with which to pay fighters, while jihadi groups appear to have far more of both.
The balance of forces will change when anti-jihadi groups can arm and train all the men they can attract, including attracting them from other forces to which they have gone because those forces were able to feed and clothe them and supply modern weapons. Without such a fighting force, there is no hope that the power of the regime or the jihadis can be countered.
Second, the United States should punish Assad for the continuing use of chemical warfare. This means an air strike robust enough to damage CW targets, including units that have used CW and any air assets ever used to deliver them. Any strike should at this point be broad enough to greatly restrict Assad's ability to use air power as an instrument of terror. More broadly, punitive air operations should be considered to force the regime to allow humanitarian aid to quickly reach those who need it. And even more broadly, air strikes can both change the military balance on the ground and affect the political and psychological dimensions of the conflict by demonstrating a new American policy and new determination.
As Anne-Marie Slaughter, director of policy planning in the State Department in Obama's first term, wrote in April 2014, "A U.S. strike against the Syrian government now would change the entire dynamic. It would either force the regime back to the negotiating table with a genuine intention of reaching a settlement, or at least make it clear that Assad will not have a free hand in reestablishing his rule."
Is such use of American air power feasible? Yes; outside of the Damascus area air defenses are quite limited and so would be the risk to the United States. This conclusion is supported by Israel's series of successful air attacks on Syria without losing one aircraft.
Third, the United States and other donors are still not delivering sufficient aid to Jordan and other neighbors of Syria to enable them to cope with the refugee crisis without severe political and economic strains—for example, on schools and hospitals. The United States and its Gulf allies, some of who are actively funding rebel groups in Syria, should undertake a serious joint review of Jordan's needs, and then act together to meet them. At West Point, the president pledged to do so.
Fourth, the United States should make it clear to allies in the region such as Israel and the Gulf Arab states that any nuclear deal with Iran will stop it from developing a nuclear weapon but will not stop Washington from confronting Iranian subversion and aggression—such as its sending hundreds of Revolutionary Guard and Quds Force combatants and advisers to Syria.
There are many suspicions in the region that a "grand bargain" between the United States and Iran is still in the cards, and that if a nuclear deal can be reached, U.S. resistance to other aspects of Iranian conduct would be softened just when sanctions relief would be giving Iran more economic resources. These fears should loudly be laid to rest. The Obama administration should clarify that it seeks a nuclear deal with Iran, but has no illusions about or intentions to negotiate a broad rapprochement with the Islamic Republic, and will help those nations that are resisting Iranian misconduct.

http://www.cfr.org/syria/syria-humanitarian-disaster-security-threat/p33082?cid=rss-analysisbriefbackgroundersexp-syria__humanitarian_disaster%E2%80%94a-061314

Iraqi crisis is unexpected prize for Kurds - Middle East Israel News | Haaretz



Baghdad loses control of north Iraq, and
Kurds realize their dream and take ancestral capital Kirkuk without a
shot fired. Are they heading for a face-off with ISIL?



Iraqi crisis is unexpected prize for Kurds - Middle East Israel News | Haaretz

Al-Qaida linked organization takes responsibility for alleged kidnapping - Diplomacy and Defense Israel News | Haaretz

 Dawlat al-Islam is linked to ISIS, the Sunni
militant organization behind this week's Iraq insurgency. Validity of
claim still being investigated by Israel.

Al-Qaida linked organization takes responsibility for alleged kidnapping - Diplomacy and Defense Israel News | Haaretz

Monday 9 June 2014

Pakistani Taliban claims Karachi airport raid



The Pakistani Taliban has claimed responsibility for an assault on Karachi airport that has killed at least 23 people, and given warning that more attacks are on the way.
Besides the dead, at least 18 people were wounded and flights were suspended as a result of Monday's attack on Jinnah International Airport, which is Pakistan's busiest.
A spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) told Al Jazeera that the attack, which began after midnight, was in retaliation for the treatment of TTP prisoners and for air raids in North Waziristan.





Pakistani Taliban claims Karachi airport raid - Central & South Asia - Al Jazeera English

Sunday 1 June 2014

UK asylum seeker claims harrowing deportation



London, United Kingdom - A Somali man forcibly returned to Mogadishu from the UK under a controversial new scheme to send home failed asylum seekers has described how he was punched and kicked by the British guards who accompanied him, and left him bleeding in a cell after having a tooth knocked out.



UK asylum seeker claims harrowing deportation - Features - Al Jazeera English